According to industry tracker BarclayHedge, the average fund o fhedge funds in 2008 got walloped, losing 55 basis points more than the average hedge fund, which lost 21.63%.
In spite of the market recovery in 2009, in relative terms, funds of funds did worse still. As of the end of November, the BarclayHedge fund of funds index was up 9.27% while the average hedge fund was up by 21.54%. the S&P 500 equity index did better still, gaining 24.07%.
The promise of greater security from judiciously melding funds into a greater composite seems as dubious as the notion that hedge fnds are a source of absolute returns, with investors suffering the added insult of an extra layer of fees.
Industry observers suggest several reasons for this substantial underperformance. First, some managers have found themselves locked into funds that held substantial portions of illiquid investments in sidepockets. These are places where funds can set aside specific assets from being liquidated to meet redemption requests. Restricted access to assets prevented managers from reallocating into funds and strategies that rebounded in 2009.
Funds of funds were also hit by a massive decline in assets. According to SolWaksman, founder of BarclayHedge, third quarter 2009 fund of funds assets were $596bn down from their 2007 peak of nearly $1200bn. Mr Waksman says this deterioration in net flows and performance has also made it challenging to allocate cash into more promising funds.
Kristoffer Houlihan, director of risk management at Pacific Alternative Asset Management Company, a fund of funds manager with $9bn in assets, also attributes much of the industry’s lackluster performance to a greater aversion to risk.
According to Mr Waksman, managers were also challenged by the fact that 2009 was among the most bifurcated years on record. In the first quarter stocks were hit by a relentless selloff that eroded any remaining confidence that one could, in effect, bottom-fish a down market. This was then followed by an extraordinary bull market that, to many, appeared to be driven more by the depths to which securities had sunk than the return of more promising fundamentals. Managers who had already been burned were therefore not going to invest aggressively into a bear market rally.
Then there was the issue of a significant reduction in leverage, which had been vital for helping funds of funds generate profits that more than cover their additional layer of expenses. In the arena of asset-backed loans, a traditionally profitable, low-risk strategy, the sudden elimination of leverage effectively froze nearly all funds of funds.
According to Jonathan Kanterman, managing director at Stillwater Capital Partners, who runs both individual ABL hedge funds and fund of funds, several major banks were forced by regulators to improve their capital ratios. To help do so, they reduced their leverage facilities across the board.
ABL funds of funds were then forced to return hundreds of millions of dollars to the banks by redeeming shares in underlying funds. This is turn squeezed individual ABL funds to either liquidate positions in a lousy market or lock up capital until they could dispose of loans or collateral in an orderly manner.
Many investors were hurt as the sudden industry-wide withdrawal of leverage transformed a patient medium-term strategy into something it was not, a short-term trade. Without sufficient liquidity to meet redemptions, more than 150 of these funds were foced to gate, temporarily suspend or wind down their operations. Many of these these issues affecting funds of fund performance were then compounded by insufficient transparency. This prevented many managers from truly knowing their composite risk in terms of sector, asset class, currency, leverage and related duration. Moreover, managers could not be certain how aggregate risk was reduced or enhanced by the way in which total exposure was blended.
To discern aggregate risk for funds of funds requires much of the same analysis needed to assess individual hedge funds, including stress testing, liquidity assessment, and historical and conditional value at risk.
Independent and full-service third-party administrators are essential to ensuring accurate pricing and trade information. It is believed that a fund should not engage in trading, borrowing or lending with any broker-dealer that is a related entity. There needs to be independent custody to ensure legitimacy of assets.